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(i) Introduction 
 
This paper has been written as a contribution to the current policy debate about the status of 
biotechnology for African development. As we move into the 21st century it has become clear that 
biotechnology is certain to play a key role in economic and social development throughout the 
world. Already its impact on agriculture, health and the environment has been noted widely in the 
relevant literature but this is nothing compared to the widely held expectation that this generic 
technology will revolutionise these and other sectors in the coming decades. However, 
biotechnology is also a two-edged sword in that its capacity to modify and alter the course of 
nature raises many questions of ethics and risk. Unless these are resolved its economic potential 
is certain to be compromised. And for developing countries in particular, therefore, such issues of 
risk perception and management have great significance. This was recognised at a relatively 
early stage in Article 8 (g) of the Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD), which enjoins all 
signatories to: 
 
Establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks 
associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting 
from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts 
that could affect the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
taking into account the risks to human health.1  
 
As Essegbey and Stokes (1998) point out the risks are of two main types: “those associated with 
the contained use of biotechnological processes and intermediate products in laboratories; and 
potential risks and uncertainty of the impacts of biotechnological products when released into the 
wider environment”.2 However, while the former have been reasonably well catered for in most 
countries in terms of regulatory guidelines, the situation is not so clear-cut for the latter category.  
In the USA and Europe, risk assessment has been done on a step-by-step, case-by-case basis 
(Commandeur et al. 1996:3) and has co-evolved with technology development, governance 
structures and management expertise. However, in many parts of the Third World the 
“international diffusion of biotechnologies is progressing at far greater speed than their original 
development, leading to fears that developing countries are, or soon will be, exposed to 
biotechnology related risks which they do not yet have the capacity to manage.”3 The question 
then is how should they plan to cope with this dilemma in the best interests of development. 
 
This paper addresses the issue in the following way. Section (ii) gives an account of what 
biotechnology can do for Africa providing a broad canvas of the potential benefits. Section (iii) 
explores risks associated with biotechnology, giving examples to illustrate the points made. 
Section (iv) goes on to ask the question “how do scientists account for risks?” Here a distinction is 
made between those risks that are measurable in some objective fashion on the one hand, and 
those that are not on the other. The conclusion here is that objective measurement of risk is much 
less straightforward than perhaps people imagine. Section (v) asks the same question about risks 
associated with biotechnology, using agriculture as the main focus since health applications are 
still some way off in Africa. Section (vi) considers implications for public policy while Section (vii) 
examines briefly the likely impact of sectional interests on policy outcomes. Section (viii) 
concludes with the simple message that only by building appropriate capacity in African citizens 
and institutions will its countries be in a reasonable position to harness biotechnology in a truly 
benefit-enhancing and risk-minimising fashion. 
 
(ii) What can biotechnology do for Africa? 
 
How then has biotechnology impinged on the developing world? Here both the threats and 
promises are considerable. In agriculture, for example, biotechnology promises the capacity to 
improve radically rates of growth of primary commodities such as cash crops for export. For 
example, tissue culture is now being used to promote the production of high value horticulture 
crops such as cut flowers and vegetables for European markets4. Other potential export products 
                                                 
1 See Glowka et al (1994), p. 45. 
2 Op. cit. p 35. 
3 Essegbey and Stokes, op. cit. p. 6. 
4 See Clark (2002) for a series of examples of this. 
are fine chemicals and cosmetics based on plant genetic resources that are native to many 
African countries.  In the realm of food security also, the potential benefits for many subsistence 
farmers are likely to be considerable. For example, Wambugu et al. (2000) shows how tissue 
culture has been used to promote the production of disease-free bananas in East Africa, thus 
dealing with a major problem of the region. On a more industrial scale new genetically engineered 
seeds have the potential to substantially increase yields through for example, minimising the 
influence of poor soils or reducing the impact of harmful pests. One well-known example is that of 
Bt Maize. This is a form of maize that has been modified with a gene from a bacterium, Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt), which codes for a toxin against pests such as the Stemborer. This pathogen 
has had a devastating effect on maize yields in recent years. By incorporating the toxin into the 
seed itself the pathogen is destroyed as soon as it attempts to invade the young crop. 
 
Sometimes such applications involve inputs from international companies, like for example the 
Monsanto-CINVESTAV agreement for the transfer of transgenic virus resistant potato technology. 
CINVESTAV is the acronym for the Centre of Research and Advanced Studies, a Mexican public 
R&D institute that has actively building plant biotechnology capacity for some years now. Under 
this arrangement Monsanto transferred a technology that can protect the potato from two major 
viruses plus relevant training for scientists and the legal rights to exploit that technology in 
Mexico. For CINVESTAV the advantages were that the arrangement would add to their long-term 
capacity in this general field rather than lead to immediate benefits for the poor farmer. There are 
a number of factors here but according to Bustamente (1995) they are mainly concerned with the 
economics of potato production. For the small farmer the risks associated with normally highly 
unstable market prices and the high investments typically necessary in this sector (for fertilisers, 
seed potatoes, insecticides, fungicides and nematocides) make the marginal benefits from this 
technology very small. And in fact the large production groups in the north of the country have 
shown the main interest because the technology will improve the profitability of the seed potato 
sub-sector. However, Commandeur (1996) points out that there are likely longer-term benefits 
from the technology in that there are now better possibilities to apply the resultant capabilities to 
areas with more direct applicability to problems of poor farmers. 
 
In health, breakthroughs in the new science of genomics show that resultant biotechnology 
applications have the potential (through improved diagnostic and therapeutic tools) to reduce 
considerably the impact of endemic disease. For example, Cuba has now developed a Meningitis 
B vaccine for which the US, no less, has broken its trade embargo and now permits imports. 
Similarly India has identified a candidate vaccine for Malaria5. A more generic example here is 
vaccine development which DNA technology is expected to revolutionise in the future. DNA 
vaccines have only recently started the testing process, but are expected to replace eventually 
other methods of vaccine production. To state it simply, conventional vaccines are made from 
either live, weakened pathogen (disease causing agent) or a killed pathogen. Vaccines produced 
using live pathogens confer greater and longer-lasting immunity than those using killed 
pathogens, but carry some risk of causing the full-blown disease to develop. DNA vaccines 
contain only those genes of the pathogen, which produce the antigen and not those used by the 
pathogen to reproduce itself in host cells. Therefore, DNA vaccines are expected to combine the 
effectiveness of live vaccines with the comparative safety of those based on killed pathogens. 
Several preventative and therapeutic vaccines for HIV are currently in early trials. DNA vaccines 
are likely to be more extensively available to developing countries than conventionally produced 
vaccines. First, the cost of DNA is low compared to producing weakened live organisms. Second, 
DNA vaccines are more stable at normal temperatures. Refrigeration costs can take up to 80% of 
a vaccination programme’s budget where conventional vaccines are used in tropical countries 
 
A second case is in disease diagnosis where two key broad areas of modern biotechnology are 
now used. The first is cell fusion, which involves the production of self-replicating antibodies – 
Monoclonal Antibodies - for a specific antigen, or disease agent. Monoclonal antibody diagnostic 
tests have been on the market for several years and are now one of the most profitable areas of 
commercial biotechnology. These diagnostic tests are actually quite inexpensive to produce, and 
this presents opportunities for some developing countries to enter the international biotechnology 
market, and also develop diagnostics for diseases of particular local relevance where these do 
not yet exist. The second area of biotechnology used for diagnostics is DNA technology. DNA 
probes, which use isolated segments of DNA to ‘attract’ complementary gene sequences from 
pathogens, are already on the market. They are relatively cheap to produce, and are usually 
                                                 
5 See Singer and Daar (2001) 
more stable in transit and in tropical climates, than conventional diagnostics. DNA diagnostics are 
likely to grow into a major product area in the future, due to the developments taking place on 
DNA arrays, which are also known as DNA chips, and micro arrays. Micro arrays allow the 
detection and analysis of thousands of genes in a single small sample, giving the power of many 
DNA probes in one small array. Micro array technology is also expected to greatly increase the 
efficiency of drug discovery, though no drugs have as yet been developed using the technology.6 
 
(iii) What are the risks and threats? 
 
On the other hand biotechnology carries with many risks. For example, there are dangers that 
new synthetic substitutes derived from biotechnology can drive traditional export products out of 
the market. Already companies based in the North can produce products like pyrethrum and 
artificial sweeteners without any recourse at all to traditional products and the chances are that 
this capacity will grow considerably over the coming decades. In addition, concerns have been 
expressed in recent years regarding the way international seed corporations have begun to 
dominate agricultural production in many developing countries, for example through using 
genetically engineered seeds. One of the potential problems is that the novel gene might be 
unintentionally transferred by pollination to other plants, including weeds and also wild relatives of 
the crop species. Scientific research has shown that this is technically possible, but the potential 
long-term impacts this might have are still unclear. There are fears that such transfers could lead 
to the development of resistant ‘super-weeds’, loss of genetic diversity within crop species, and 
possibly even the destabilisation of entire ecosystems. This last concern also emerges from the 
specific application of Bt, where the genetic modification results in toxin being produced directly 
by the crop. Environmentalists argue that the toxin might unintentionally be taken up by non-
targeted organisms, which might destroy populations of benign insect species. There are also 
issues associated with intellectual property rights and dangers that alternative “non-GMO” 
solutions to food security may become marginalised simply because the exercise of corporate 
power closes off such options. Finally there are worries that rapid growth of export-based 
horticulture may lead to environmental damage. 7  
 
Again with health applications, however, there are “risks” involved. These are of three types. The 
first refers to unforeseen dangers associated with technology use. For example in the vaccine 
case outlined above there are still some uncertainties about the potential for vaccine DNA to 
‘invade’ the host’s genome and possibly trigger genes relating to tumour development. There is 
therefore a great deal of caution surrounding the development of DNA vaccines at this time. The 
second type of risk relates to ethical issues associated with interference with the fundamental 
building blocks of life. Here there has been considerable discussion in Europe and North America 
though not so much in Africa. A good example is where an individual’s genetic information may 
become available to organisations outside the medical profession, including insurance companies 
and employers. There are therefore concerns about loss of privacy, and genetic discrimination. 
The third is the bias of related R & D towards so-called “rich country diseases” such as 
Alzheimer’s disease, Huntingdon’s chorea and many types of cancer. Conversely diseases such 
as AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis that bedevil African populations receive comparatively little 
research support. Arguably this bias is driven primarily by considerations of profit on the part of 
the international pharmaceuticals industry. 
 
(iv) How do scientists account for risks?  
 
To understand the problems involved in risk analysis in relation to biotechnology it is necessary to 
take a step back in time. Science has always understood that technological and economic 
interventions are subject to risks. But such risks were seen as computable in the sense that 
values could be assigned to them. Decision-makers would then combine standard estimates of 
contributions to welfare with such risk values before making final policy recommendations. For 
example, the decision to introduce an innovation in crop production in a region would depend first 
of all on projected net benefits, which would be determined, say, through social cost-benefit 
analysis (SCBA). SCBA typically values expected outputs and inputs to projects and computes a 
resultant “rate of return” to the relevant capital investments. But these estimates would then be 
adjusted to allow for factors preventing the expected costs and benefits being realised. The 
techniques used would vary but ultimately would rest on probability theory—that is by computing 
                                                 
6 See Zweiger (2000) for a detailed discussion of many of these techniques. 
7 For a detailed account of these and many related issues see papers in LEISA (2001)  
the likelihood of sub-optimal performance based on past events of a similar nature.8 The adjusted 
projected net benefits would be computed and the decision to go ahead with the intervention 
would then proceed according to some wider set of decision criteria (for example whether or not 
the adjusted rate of return to the investment exceeded some numerical percentage like the 
current social discount rate used by the national planning agency).9 
 
Of course it was always realised that such numerical forecasts would be imperfect. To take this 
into account a “safety” factor was often also added to allow for the possibility of “non-computable” 
risks. For example in the building of a new bridge, it would be accepted that despite over a 
century of bridge-building knowledge on the part of civil engineers, things could still go wrong. 
And therefore so-called “fail safe” factors would be included to allow for this. But (and this is the 
important point) ultimately the system in question was always seen to be computable in principle. 
It existed as an objective entity in reality, however hard it was to formulate it numerically in 
practice. As Thompson (2000) has put it, the view is based on an acceptance of 18th Century 
Natural Law and the utilitarian ethics that followed from the Enlightenment. It is useful at this 
stage in the argument to distinguish between two criticisms of this view.10 The first is a systems 
criticism. The second one is an ethical one. 
 
On the first it is essential to realise that much of modern experimental science is based on the 
view that the system under investigation is relatively stable. This then allows it to be subject to 
experiment and characterisation in the sense that its parameters are computable.  Once we know 
these, we can predict with some certainty how it will behave in future periods. If you like we can 
assign probability values to future behaviour based upon how the system has behaved in past 
periods. On the other hand if the system in question is evolving in terms of its underlying 
structure, then such a procedure is flawed simply because its parameters are no longer stable. 
Indeed its parametric instability increases in proportion to its rate of evolution. This need not be 
too much a problem in bridge building (bridges, and their immediate environments, are relatively 
stable systems) but is certain to be a serious problem in a field such as biotechnology subject to 
very rapid technical change. Here assigning probability values to, say, the impact of a GMO 
becomes impossible simply because the future “states of nature” are unknown. We live genuinely 
in a state of ignorance about the future system in question.11 
 
The second criticism is equally fundamental. For even if formal risk analysis could show that an 
intervention is likely to be relatively harmless there may still be important issues associated with 
values and ethics. Thompson, for example, shows how in the context of the GM controversy 
consumers became “deeply resentful of a marketing approach that denied them the opportunity to 
give or withhold consent. Even consumers who thought of themselves as potentially benefiting 
from GM foods nevertheless insisted upon the right to decide for themselves whether to eat it or 
not.”12 Tait (2000) shows how throughout the 1990’s there arose increased resistance among 
many sections of European public opinion to the use of biotechnology to modify crop production. 
Some of this may have been “irrational” in the formal scientific sense but by no means all. The 
impact of “mad cow” disease in the UK did great damage to public trust of government regulation. 
It also called in question the relative inability of science to provide a coherent impartial judgement 
of such issues. Nor did the early attitude of industry help. Tait and Chataway (2000), for example, 
show how “Monsanto’s response to European calls for a more precautionary approach to 
                                                 
8 Thus formally a distinction is made between “risk” and “uncertainty”. In the latter whereas future states of 
nature are known there is not enough prior knowledge available to determine an exact set of probabilities. 
In such cases these would be estimated with aid of by “experts”, those who were trusted to know the state-
of-the-art and could make judgements with authority. This type of technique is sometimes called a 
Bayesian technique after the scientist who first suggested this statistical approach. See Clark and O’Donnell 
(1986) for a discussion of the use of Bayesian formulae in relation to Third World science policy decisions. 
9 Alternatively where investment funds were limited only the high value projects would be sanctioned 
10 See Thompson (2000) page 24, for a reference to John Stuart Mill in this context. 
11 Again more rigorously, a distinction should be made between “uncertainty” and “ignorance”. In the 
former future states of nature are known. In the latter they are not, in which case the assigning of objective 
probabilities becomes impossible. In the case of biotechnology change the level of ignorance is certain to 
be considerable. Clark and Juma (1992) explore these issues in respect of technology more generally. See 
Chapters 1 and 9. 
12 See op. cit. p. 25. Thompson also makes reference to Durant, Bauer and Gaskell (1998). 
regulation was to mount a campaign of opposition”13, including a refusal to countenance “product 
labelling” as mechanism that might allay public concerns. And though much of the agro-
biotechnology industry has now come to realise that a more inclusive strategy is probably 
necessary to deal with such issues, a great deal of damage has been done to their corporate 
interests. 
 
To re-cap, the application of formal risk analysis to biotechnology issues is twofold. Firstly it runs 
foul of the speed at which biotechnology is moving. And so has difficulty in making judgements 
that stand up to strict scientific scrutiny. Even the application of fail-safe devices does not deal 
properly with the problem, not least because all too frequently scientists have been less that 
candid about the validity of their methods. Secondly, however, there are important ethical 
objections about the very nature of biotechnology interventions, and these concern the rights of 
the public to agree or not with them whatever may be the objective risks involved. Here many 
environmental groups have emerged in recent years to argue vigorously against the application of 
the biosciences to many aspects of economic production. And they are doing so to great effect 
not only in Europe but also in many Third World countries. 
 
(v) How can we account for risks in biotechnology? 
 
In order to deal meaningfully with the risks associated with modern biotechnology, therefore, a 
range of new approaches has been suggested and it is useful at this stage to summarise what 
these might be. Central to these is the notion of the Precautionary Principle, which began to 
emerge as an important conceptual organiser in the build up to the UNCED Earth Summit in the 
early 1990’s. Hence Common (1995) quotes Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as follows: 
 
In order to protect the environment the precautionary principle shall be widely 
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.14 
 
The Precautionary Principle is thus essentially a general injunction to decision-makers to 
postpone action where the environment is at risk but as Common points out “it does not offer 
much in the way of guidance as to how the problem should be dealt with. To say that a lack of 
certainty should not inhibit measures to protect the environment from serious and irreversible 
damage does not indicate what should be done and how it should be done. Nor does the principle 
suggest how one might set about answering such questions.”15 Common goes on to discuss 
some recent proposed mechanisms designed to operationalise the Precautionary Principle like 
the adoption of a Safe Minimum Standard or the posting of Environmental Performance Bonds16 
for project interventions. However, in both cases these are controversial and have been subject to 
criticisms even for well-defined projects. In the case of radical biotechnological change it is 
difficult to see how a specific decision tool of such types could play a useful role. 
 
Nevertheless it is clear that in many countries the Precautionary Principle is having practical 
influence. Tait (2001), for example, shows how many European countries have now begun to 
take a much more cautious approach to biotechnology policy, especially with regard to the advent 
of GM crops. Her view is that the time has come to take the precautionary principle much more 
seriously than has been the case in the past. But this cannot be done through the simple 
application of the old risk-based formulae for the simple reason that we are now dealing with 
future events and our perceptions of such events and their implications. Here we are in a world of 
great uncertainty and ignorance, where views are influenced by economic, social, ethical and 
ideological interests, and therefore where decision-making has to be consensual if it is to be 
successful. Indeed one of the major problems faced by industry, science and government is that 
for many years each of these “estates” has refused to see the issue in this light and has therefore 
lost credibility in the eyes of ordinary people. Tait calls for a constructive dialogue among all 
interested parties so as to clarify the issues and reach a social consensus on all the underlying 
                                                 
13 See p. 6. 
14 See Common (1995) p. 213 
15 Ibid. p. 214. 
16 See also Perrings (1989) 
problems. This does not mean abandoning science. Rather it implies the need to recognise the 
limitations of science in a field that is developing very fast indeed. 
 
But how should this be done? The first step is to recognise who the interest groups are and what 
factors influence their views. Tait identifies the following: 
 
• Environmental pressure groups (ENGO’s) 
• Consumer organisations (CNGOs) 
• Multinational companies (MNCs) 
• Small scale industry (SME’S) 
• Farmers and farmer organisations (FOs) 
• The public research system (and the scientists that work in it). 
• Government ministries and secretariats. 
 
Each of these interest groups generally view issues of biotechnology risk quite differently even 
where the presenting evidence appears to be very similar. But their views are neither static nor 
homogeneous. For example “unlike their American counterparts, several European companies 
would have been prepared at an early stage to accept labelling of food products arising from GM 
crops, avoiding one of the stimuli which has had an important impact on European public 
opinion.”17 Again Paarlberg (2000) shows how agricultural and scientific ministries are usually 
much more promotional to biotechnology that are environmental ministries. And the views of 
European CNGO’s have certainly changed from a neutral position to a much more hostile position 
over the 1990’s as trust in regulatory authority has dissipated (Tait 2001). 
 
In a recent IFPRI publication Paarlberg (2000) has analysed policies towards GM crops in four 
developing countries, Brazil, China, India and Kenya. Of these only China has been positive 
about granting permission for planting to go ahead. In each of the other countries international 
pressures from ENGO’s, CNGO’s and donors are working to discourage such developments 
despite the fact that government agencies in all three countries are much more positive towards 
GM crops. In China’s case, however, NGO pressure groups are simply not allowed to function. 
Interestingly enough Paarlberg concludes that the existence of IPR regimes is not by any means 
the main determinant of MNC behaviour in any of the countries. Monsanto, for example, has been 
offering to share GM sweet potato technology with Kenyan scientists for nearly a decade but has 
been prohibited on biosafety grounds. In China MNC’s have been quite happy to enter into 
collaboration agreements despite widespread and blatant IPR piracy. Conversely, a relatively 
strong IPR regime in Brazil has not in itself been enough to get a GM revolution going in that 
country (Paarlberg 2000)18. Stokes (1998) has come to similar conclusions in her study of 
Zimbabwean biotechnology policy. 
 
A related issue concerns international trade. Because trade in GM crops, for example, is subject 
also to the WTO agreement, in effect signing up to the WTO has constrained countries’ abilities to 
prevent imports of GM crops on grounds of risk and safety. Because of the importance of this 
issue the WTO has set up a Committee on Trade and Environment to deal with associated 
disputes. As Tait and Bruce (2001) point out, however, the current WTO position is that such 
trade restrictions should be based on current internationally agreed food safety regulations and 
that if national standards are higher than these current Codex standards, “the additional 
safeguards must be based on scientific evidence and grounded in risk assessment.”19  In other 
words the WTO position does not recognise the wider view of risks associated with biotechnology 
development as outlined above. 
 
(vi) How can Africa manage risk and uncertainty? 
 
How then should African governments proceed with respect to biosafety issues given the 
promises and threats of modern biotechnology? I suggest that an important necessary condition 
                                                 
17 See Tait, Op. cit. p. 184. 
18 See Paarlberg (2000), Page 30. 
19 See Tait and Bruce (2001) p. 105. These standards refer to the Codex Alimentarius established in the 
1960s by the FAO and WHO Tait and Bruce show that the Codex contains more than 200 standards for 
foodstuffs and in 1998 membership of the Codex Commission comprised 163 countries representing 97% 
of the world population. They also refer to the Codex web site--- www.fao.org./docrep/w9114e/  
is the building up capacity to understand biotechnology in all its aspects so that whatever 
regulatory/promotional regime countries put in place are as fully informed as possible. And it is 
here that such countries are bound to confront a much more basic issue of S/T policy—the 
inability of traditional governance structures to fully understand the details of possible technology 
developments and hence to construct effective plans and policies to promote them safely. For 
while there are usually well-trained scientists within national laboratory systems who are well able 
to understand the detailed nature of biotechnology they are often not well connected into 
decision-making structures at government level. At the same time the degree of “connectivity” 
between relevant S/T organisations is often not very good either. What this means in practice is 
that since “innovation systems” are not well developed, mechanisms for relevant governance are 
hampered by lack of knowledge.20 
 
I would therefore recommend that countries take an approach similar to that recommended by 
Tait (2001). First of all national governments should recognise explicitly they are dealing with an 
extremely complex issue for which there are no simple solutions. Certainly they should not 
assume that they can issue directives from on high and wait for these issues to be obeyed 
uncritically. Secondly they should begin to encourage dialogue between and among all relevant 
stakeholders with the aim of clarifying the true nature of the issues and minimising degrees of 
misunderstanding and confusion. One good example of how this might be done is a recent 
attempt in Ghana to raise biotechnology awareness through the use of a “stakeholder 
conference”. In this case a donor-funded project brought together as many interest groups 
representatives as possible with a view to setting priorities for biotechnology development in 
Ghana over the medium term.21 Led by a policy research organ from a key ministry the project 
team then went on to conduct research into how well such stated priorities are being met in 
practice, through an analysis of secondary literature and interviews with individual stakeholder 
groups. Finally a smaller feedback workshop was arranged at which results were discussed and 
disseminated. At the same time a newsletter was produced and disseminated as widely as 
possible so that all groups could feel they were part of this dialogue and could benefit from the 
resultant exchange of views. It is not difficult to see how the appropriate use of the Internet could 
enhance and promote such initiatives. 
 
Thirdly, countries need to do more to build up relevant S/T capacities amongst civil servants. As 
Paarlberg (2000) points out biosafety administrators are prone to err on the side of undue caution 
if they know that they will be subject to NGO and media criticism. This has certainly been the 
case in Kenya where the drafting of policies has proceeded much faster than the capacity to 
administer the resulting decisions. Indeed donors have an important role to play here since they 
are apparently much readier to fund the drafting of biosafety policies that the building up of 
necessary implementation capacity. Indeed it is interesting to note that of all countries in the 
Paarlberg study, it is arguably the one that has done most to build up an independent (of donors) 
biotechnology capacity (China) that has done most to promote the sensible use of GM crops for 
development. Fourthly, developing countries need to do more at Higher Education level to 
provide their scientists with an understanding of the social and economic contexts within which 
biotechnology is likely to develop. So fundamental is this technology to practically every avenue 
in modern life, that training the current generation of students solely in narrow areas of relevant 
disciplines (like molecular genetics, for example), is certain to produce graduates that have great 
difficulty in providing the necessary advice to policy makers. 
 
All this is not say that progress is not being made. The intense dialogue surrounding the drafting 
of the Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention (signed finally in Cartagena in January 
2000) shows that countries can certainly get their act together when it comes to international 
policy. In this case the big debate took place between two major blocs; the so-called Miami group 
of countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Uruguay and the USA) and the Like-minded 
group of developing countries (including Africa) and NGOs. The former group felt they had most 
to lose in terms of trade and were much less willing to agree to a restrictive protocol than the 
latter group. It was able to “water down labelling requirements and succeed in that the protocol 
applies only to LMOs so that no segregation is required for non-living GM organisms”22. However, 
the very fact that the Like-minded group were unsuccessful here may well reflect their weaker 
capacity to argue what must have been a complex case at that event. In other words while 
                                                 
20 See for example Clark (2002) 
21 See Essegbey et al. (2000). The donor in this case was the UK bilateral agency DFID. 
22 Tait and Bruce Op. cit. p. 107. 
countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, have clearly begun to engage with these issues 
their capacity to do this in an informed way is still some way short of what is desirable. 
 
(vii) Whose interests are the interest groups serving? 
 
A final point to stress is that policy makers should be made fully aware of the “interests” of 
different lobbies. To the extent they are not, this then allows different interest groups to exploit a 
confused situation to try to achieve advantage for this or that position, regardless of the objective 
situation. Paarlberg, for example, shows how the NGO sector in India has been able to stir up 
popular feeling against GM technology by playing on fears about the activities of international 
corporations. And this is despite the fact that in some cases the adoption of GM technology could 
have beneficial consequences. For example, India’s cotton factors are “plagued by bollworms that 
have become resistant to chemical sprays. Insecticidal Bt cotton presents an alternative method 
to control bollworms, yet efforts by Monsanto/Mahyco since 1997 to gain biosafety approval-------
have repeatedly been slowed by NGO protests. By filing law suits---and by sponsoring physical 
attacks against field trials, anti-GM activist groups in India have transformed the biosafety 
approval process into a highly politicised—and at times paralysed--- policy struggle”.23 Thus an 
activity with clear development and environmental benefits has been stopped by pressure groups 
that ostensibly are working in the best interests of the environment and development. The issue 
here is usually about a perceived conflict between commercial and environmental interests 
though often the conflict may in reality be much less that perceptions would indicate. Policy 
makers should be aware of these issues and be able to come to sensible judgments on cognate 
decisions.  
 
Nor are the battles confined to the NGO sector since there are often similar conflicts at 
government level. For example, environmental ministries often tend to take a fairly negative view 
about biotechnology whereas ministries of science are usually more sanguine.  A good example 
of this is in Brazil where disagreements between environmental and science ministries have 
clearly played an important role in slowing down biotechnology development. Another source of 
conflict may occasionally be the donor community whose ideological biases may be in a negative 
direction and who may therefore try to prevent or hold up, biotechnology applications. There is 
some evidence that Kenyan biosafety legislation has been thus influenced by donors whose 
views may have been so slanted.24 The important point again is that those making national 
policies in such areas should be aware of these factors and take them into account in policy 
formulation. And where they feel the lack necessary technical competence to take fully informed 
decisions, they should know how to commission advice from disinterested expertise. 
 
(viii) Concluding comments 
 
This paper has been written as a contribution to current debates about biotechnology policy in 
and for Africa. Inevitably it has set out the issue in relatively simple terms and readers are 
encouraged to consult the cited texts and other sources for more detailed discussion of the 
issues. However, not only is biotechnology now evolving very rapidly, it is almost certainly going 
to play a fundamental role in future development policies in both developed and developing 
countries. It promises immense gains in food security, environmental protection, agriculture, 
health and industrial production. But it also interferes with living processes in ways, and to 
degrees that have never occurred before in human history. We simply do not know what the 
impacts will be, how widely spread and with what effects. Moreover the advent of third generation 
biotechnology has raised ethical issues that are deeply felt by people and organisations at all 
levels. All the more reason, therefore, to approach associated public policy analysis with as much 
dispassion and objectivity as possible. My suggestion is that decision-making in this sphere 
should not rest solely upon narrow instruments of decision-making as conventionally understood. 
Instead governments must establish new initiatives, capabilities and institutions that can have a 
profound effect on legitimacy at a much more fundamental level. Unfortunately there are no 
standard models here. Each country must establish its own procedures in the light of its own 
unique circumstances. 
 
But in order to do this sensibly there must be radically increased investment in the associated 
science base and supportive institutions such as schools, regulatory bodies and government 
                                                 
23 Op. cit. p. 19 
24 Ibid. pp. 15 and 12. 
departments. At one level the argument is straightforward. So strategic is biotechnology 
nowadays that no country can afford to neglect it. However, at a deeper level the issue is by no 
means clear-cut since it begs the question "what is biotechnology capacity?" Essegbey and 
Stokes (1998) show that capacity goes well beyond "laboratories plus scientists". Indeed in most 
African countries shortages of suitably trained scientific manpower in the life sciences may not be 
the basic issue (though there are of course constraints here, as well as lack of equipment and 
related laboratory apparatus). What seems to be mainly missing, however, in many cases are the 
entrepreneurial capabilities, supportive institutions and associated networks needed to translate 
raw scientific knowledge into economic production.25 It is this systemic competence that 
determines "biotechnology capacity" and that appears in very short supply.26 Nevertheless the 
agenda is clear. While African countries should certainly continue to monitor their use of this 
powerful new technology, their success in so doing will depend on building up the appropriate 
capacity. The time to start this process is now. 
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